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M A T E OF UTAH 
MARK L S H U R T L E F F 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
RAYMOND A. HINTZE KIRK TORGENSEN 
Chief Deputy Chief Deputy 
March 18, 2003 
Paulette Stagg 
Clerk of the Court 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
450 South State Street 
Post Office Box 140210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0210 
Re: State v. Angelos, Case No. 20010509-CA 
Dear Ms. Stagg: 
I am writing pursuant to rule 24(i), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to 
advise the Court of authority relevant to the above-referenced case that recently 
came to my attention. The following cases relate to defendant's claim that the trial 
court was without jurisdiction when it resentenced him while the case was on appeal. 
These cases support the State's argument that a sentence imposed on an unrepre-
sented defendant is illegal and may be corrected by the trial court at any time under 
rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure: 
State v. Headley, 2002 UT App 58 (Memorandum Decision)1 ("Utah law has 
no comprehensive definition of sentences 'imposed in an illegal manner'; however, 
the Utah Supreme Court has ruled that a sentence is imposed in an illegal manner 
when a defendant is deprived of his or her Sixth Amendment right to counsel during 
sentencing"); 
Kuehnertv. Turner, 28 Utah 2d 150,499 P.2d 839, 841 (1975) (concluding 
that the sentence was illegal because the defendant did not have counsel at 
sentencing, was not informed of his Sixth Amendment rights during sentencing, and 
had not knowingly and intelligently waived his Sixth Amendment rights); 
1
 This case is cited pursuant to Grand County v. Rogers, 2002 UT 25, \ 16,444 P.3d. 
734, which allows the citation to memorandum decisions. 
160 EAST 300 SOUTH, SIXTH FLOOR • PO Box 140854 • SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-0854 • TEL (801) 366-0180 • FAX (801) 366-0167 
State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 676,679 (Utah App. 1991) ("Because an illegal 
sentence is void, the court does not lose jurisdiction over the sentence until that 
sentence has been corrected"). 
A copy of these opinions is attached for the convenience of the Court. 
Thank you for your attention to this matter. 
Very truly yours, 
BRETT J. DELPORTO 
Assistant Attorney General 
cc: Scott Wiggins, attorney for defendant 
William K. McGuire, Deputy David County attorney 
Not Reported in P.2d 
State v. Headley, 2002 UT App 58 (Memorandum Opinion) 
(Cite as: 2002 WL 287890 (Utah App.)) 
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK 
COURT RULES BEFORE CITING. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Thomas C. HEADLEY, Defendant and 
Appellant. 
No- 990462-CA. 
Feb. 28, 2002. 
Edward R. Montgomery, Salt Lake City, 
for appellant. 
Mark L Shurtlcff and Thomas Branker, 
Salt Lake City, for appellee. 
Before JACMQN, GREENWOOD, and 
THORNE, JJ. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For 
Official Publication) 
JACK SON, Presiding Judge. 
*1 Thomas Headley appeals the district 
court's denial of his Motion to Correct 
Illegal Sentence submitted under Rule 
22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. He contends the district court 
erred in ruling that his motion did "not 
attack the legality of the sentence imposed 
nor the manner in which the sentence was 
imposed." Headley's contention is 
two-fold: (1) his counsel at sentencing 
provided ineffective assistance; and (2) the 
sentencing court relied on information in 
the presentence report that the court knew 
was false. We affirm. 
A district court's Rule 22(e) decision is a 
legal question that we review for 
correctness, see.y.{WL^ 
856. 858-59 fUtah 1995); M. . . . . I , 
Patience. 944 P,2d 38K 384-85 (Utah 
Ct.App.1997), and we can affirm the 
decision "if it is sustainable on any legal 
ground or theory apparent on the record." 
State v. FinlavsonioOQ LT 10, ff 31 »)-! 
P.2dl243. Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure provides for 
resentencing when a sentence is illegal or 
"imposed in an illegal manner." Utah 
R.Crim. P. 22(e). The definition of an 
"illegal sentence" has been construed 
narrowly to include only sentences "where 
the sentence does not conform to the crime 
of which the defendant has been 
convicted." ...[FN]J S[m..xJ^{!:kL.^2 
P.2d 104 L 1043 n. 2 fUtah Ct App. 1994V 
Utah law has no comprehensive definition 
of sentences "imposed in an illegal 
manner"; however, the Utah Supreme 
Court has ruled that a sentence is imposed 
in an illegal manner when a defendant is 
Copr. Q West 2003 No Claim to Orig U S Govt Works 
deprived of his or her Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel during sentencing. [FN2] 
See AO^/w^^ 
499Pid839>8^ (concluding that 
the sentence was illegal because the 
defendant did not have counsel at 
sentencing, was not informed of his Sixth 
Amendment rights during sentencing, and 
had not knowingly and intelligently 
waived his Sixth Amendment rights). 
[FN3] In Kuehnert, the Utah Supreme 
Court stated that the presence of counsel at 
sentencing is necessary 
FNL Nonconforming sentences 
include those where the sentence 
exceeds the statutory limits. See, 
e.g., State v. Higginhotham, 917 
P.2d ^ gg ^  TuttaJb^  19%) 
(concluding that the sentence was 
illegal because statute only 
authorized one year enhancement 
and the court enhanced sentence by 
two years); Stjate^£arleri^^9M. 
P.2d 38L 388 fUtah^  CtAppi997^ 
(noting that the sentence was illegal 
because it exceeded statutory term). 
Nonconforming sentences also 
occur when the court is without 
jurisdiction to impose a sentence. 
See, e.g., State v. Hurst. Ill P.2d 
1029, 1036 n. 6 (Utah 1989) 
(stating that sentences can be 
attacked when beyond the 
jurisdiction of the sentencing 
court); State v. Arvisa 1999 UT 
App 38L ff 5-8. 993 P.2d 894 
(stating that the sentence was 
illegal because Supremacy Clause 
deprived sentencing court of 
jurisdiction); Siate^J+'jJt^- 947 
P. 2d 1161. 1168 fUt ah 
Ct.App. 1997) (stating that the 
sentence was illegal because court 
did not have jurisdiction to revoke 
probation). 
FN2. Other jurisdictions have 
defined sentences imposed in an 
illegal manner as those that are 
within statutory and jurisdictional 
limits, but violate a defendant's 
rights, see, e.g., Qoyemineyin^jhe 
V.L v. Martinez. 239 R3d 293, 299 
n. 3 (3rd Cir.2001): State v. 
McNeills. 346 A.2d 292. 305-06 
(Conn.Ct.App, 1988): State v. 
Sieler, 554 N.W.2d 447, 479 
(S.D.1996); cf. SMt^JMe^m 
661 P.2d 716 . 720 -24 
fHaw.Ct App. 1983); State v. 
Brooks. 589 A.2d 444, 447 (Maine 
1991); or that are based on 
erroneous information. See, e.g., 
United States v. Katziru 821 F 2d 
234 238 (3rd Cir. 1987). 
FN3. Kuehnert, which discusses 
illegal sentences under the rules in 
force prior to Rule 22(e), was not 
cited in the parties' briefs. 
so that there is a real opportunity to 
present to the court facts in extenuation 
of the offense or in explanation of the 
defendant's conduct, as well as to correct 
any errors or mistakes in reports of the 
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defendant's past record and to appeal to 
the equity of the court in its 
administration and enforcement of penal 
laws. 
Id. at 840-41.XFN4J 
FN4. See also McCj !Mdly...£A(l\l 
393 U.S. 2. 4 89 S.Ct 3J 33- 34 
(1968) ("As we said in Mcmpu /v. 
Rhav. 389 L S. 128. 3 35. 88 S.Ct 
254 257(1967) ], 'the necessity for 
the aid of counsel in marshaling the 
facts, introducing evidence of 
mitigating circumstances[,] and in 
general aiding and assisting the 
defendant to present his case as to 
sentence is apparent.1 The right to 
counsel at sentencing must, 
therefore, be treated like the right to 
counsel at other stages of 
adjudication." (Citation omitted.)). 
Headley first claims his counsel at 
sentencing provided ineffective assistance, 
thus depriving him of his Sixth 
Amendment right. To support his claim, 
Headley makes six assertions, four are as 
follows: (1) he asserts that his challenge to 
misinformation in the presentence 
investigation report was rejected by the 
sentencing court because it was poorly 
handled by sentencing counsel; (2) he 
challenges several factual statements 
contained in the presentence investigation 
report; (3) he asserts that "his own counsel 
accused him of being involved in incest 
when that information was not otherwise 
before the court"; and (4) he asserts that 
"his [sentencing] counsel convinced a 
witness with potentially exculpatory 
evidence not to cooperate with [Headley]." 
Each of these four assertions has some 
connection with the presentence 
investigation report, which is not in the 
record on appeal. Further, no other 
information in the record supports these 
assertions. Accordingly, as discussed 
below, we are unable to address them. 
*2 Next, Headley claims the sentencing 
court imposed a $10,000 fine without 
reason and without objection by his 
counsel. We find no mention of a $10,000 
fine in the record. The only fines 
mentioned in the sentencing context, a 
$1,000 recoupment fee and an unspecified 
amount to "pay for costs of extradition and 
for therapy of victim," are found in the 
sentencing transcript and the Judgment 
filed three days later. Finally, Headley 
alleges that "his counsel intentionally tried 
to prevent him from pursuing an appeal." 
However, the record reflects that Headley 
filed a notice of appeal on September 24, 
1992, but voluntarily moved to dismiss his 
appeal to "file a motion to withdraw his 
plea of guilty." Headley's motion was 
granted on October 8,1992, and the record 
contains no indication of subsequent 
attempts to appeal the case. 
Without the presentence report or other 
information which may or may not be in 
the sentencing court record, the record 
submitted to us is inadequate for our 
review of Headley's ineffective assistance 
claim. All we have are Headley's 
unilateral, bald assertions of misconduct. 
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As we have stated, 
When a defendant predicates error to [an 
appellate court], he has the duty and 
responsibility of supporting such 
allegation by an adequate record. Absent 
that record, a defendant's assignment of 
error stands as a unilateral allegation 
which the reviewing court has no power 
to determine. [An appellate court] simply 
cannot rule on a question which depends 
for its existence upon alleged facts 
unsupported by the record. 
Consequently, in the face of an 
[inadequate record on appeal, [we] must 
assume the regularity of the proceedings 
below. 
Shite v. Penman. %4 P.2d 1157, 1162 
(1998) (internal quotations and citations 
omitted) (alterations in original); see also 
State v. Litherland 2000 VT 7b. «f 17, 12 
P.3d 92 ("Where the record appears 
inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or 
deficiencies resulting therefrom simply 
will be construed in favor of a finding that 
counsel performed effectively."). 
Accordingly, we reject Headley's Sixth 
Amendment claim. 
Next, Headley claims the sentencing court 
was biased because it relied on 
information in the presentence report that 
the court knew was false. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-18-1(6) fSupp.200n gives a 
sentencing judge discretion in evaluating 
information in a presentence report and 
requires the judge to "make a 
determination of relevance and accuracy 
on the record." Here, the sentencing judge 
made a determination of the relevance and 
accuracy of the presentence report, 
deciding the presentence report was 
"comprehensive in all the details," and 
stating that those working on elements of 
the presentence report "do a pretty good 
job." The sentencing court has broad 
discretion to resolve factual disputes for or 
against a defendant, see id., and we cannot 
say the court exceeded its discretion in 
making this determination. Further, 
without the presentence report, the record 
is inadequate and " '[we] must assume the 
regularity of the proceedings below.' " 
Penman. 964 P.2d al 1162 (citation 
omitted) (alteration in original). 
*3 Accordingly, we affirm the district 
court's denial of Headley's Rule 22(e) 
motion for resentencing. 
WILLIAM A/niORNE JR.. J., concur. 
CIKEEXWOQD, Judge (concurring in the 
result). 
I concur in the result reached by my 
colleagues, but would affirm on what I 
perceive to be a more straightforward 
basis. As stated by the majority, the trial 
court denied defendant's Rule 22(e) motion 
because the motion did "not attack the 
legality of the sentence imposed nor the 
manner in which the sentence was 
imposed." The trial court was correct. 
Defendant's claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel and erroneous fact 
findings by the sentencing judge are 
Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U S Govt Works 
simply not cognizable under Rule 22(e). 
Defendant has not cited any caselaw 
holding otherwise and has also not offered 
any reasoned analysis for why Rule 22(e) 
should apply to his case. See Sjgfo_\K 
Thomas. %1 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998) 
(briefs must include "reasoned analysis 
based on [cited] authority"). The sentence 
imposed was permissible under applicable 
statutes, and the trial court properly 
resolved factual disputes presented to it. 
Defendant raises no claims legitimately 
related to whether the sentence was illegal 
or "imposed in an illegal manner." Utah 
R.Crim. P. 22(e). On that basis, I would 
affirm. 
2002 WL 287890 (Utah App.), 2002 UT 
App58 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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State v. Kuehnert, 499 P.2d 839 (Utah 1972) 
(Cite as: 28 Utah 2d 150, 499 P.2d 839) 
€ 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Max KUEHNERT, Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
v. 
John W. TURNER, Warden, Utah State 
Prison, Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 12656. 
July 18, 1972. 
Prisoner petitioner for writ of habeas 
corpus. The Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, James S. Sawaya, J., entered 
order denying petition and the petitioner 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Callister, 
C.J., held that where defendant was 
represented by counsel at time his plea of 
guilty was entered and there was no entry 
as to withdrawal of counsel prior to 
sentencing at which defendant appeared 
without counsel and without receiving 
advice as to his right to counsel, absence 
of counsel rendered sentence invalid and 
cause would be remanded with directions 
to proceed to fix date for pronuncing 
sentence in proper manner. 
Remanded with directions. 
Ellett, J., concurred in the result and filed 
an opinion. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Sentencing and Punishment ^^349 
350Hk349 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 110k988) 
Since habeas corpus petitioner was not 
informed of his right to the presence of 
counsel at time of sentencing, there was no 
ground upon which to predicate a waiver 
of this right by him. Const, art, i. §£ 12, 
13. 
[2] Sentencing and Punishment € ^ 3 4 8 
350Hk348 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 110k988) 
It is necessary to have counsel present at 
time of hearing so that there is a real 
opportunity to present to court facts in 
extenuation of offense or in explanation of 
defendant's conduct, to correct any errors 
or mistakes in reports of defendant's past 
record and to appeal to equity of court in 
its administration and enforcement of 
penal laws. Const M...J.^.i.LJ2> l i ; 
U.C.A. 1953, 77-35-17. 
[3] Sentencing and Punishment €^348 
350Hk348 MMTiMCi^es 
(Formerly 110k980(l)) 
[31 Criminal Law ^1181.5(8) 
110k! 181.5(8) Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 110kll81) 
Where defendant was represented by 
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counsel at time his plea of guilty was 
entered and there was no entry as to 
withdrawal of counsel prior to sentencing 
at which defendant appeared without 
counsel and without receiving advice as to 
his right to counsel, absence of counsel 
rendered sentence invalid and cause would 
be remanded with directions to proceed to 
fix date for pronouncing sentence in 
proper manner. Const, art. K SS 12, JL3; 
U.C.A.1953, 77-35-17. 
**839 *150 Margret S. Taylor, Salt Lake 
Legal Defender Assn., Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and appellant. 
Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., David S. 
Young, David R. Irvine, Asst. Attys. Gen., 
*151 Salt Lake City, for defendant and 
respondent. 
CALLISTER, Chief Justice: 
Plaintiff appeals from an order of the 
district court denying his petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus. 
The trial court determined that plaintiff 
was lawfully incarcerated in the Utah State 
Prison pursuant to a conviction of the 
crime of forgery based upon a guilty plea, 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 
entered, and that plaintiffs rights were not 
violated by lack of counsel at the 
sentencing proceeding. 
On appeal plaintiff asserts that his 
sentence was invalid and void on the 
ground that he was without counsel at a 
critical stage of the criminal proceedings, 
namely, at the time of sentencing. 
A review of the record reveals that 
plaintiff was represented by counsel at the 
time his plea of guilty was entered; 
furthermore, there was no entry of 
withdrawal of counsel prior to sentencing. 
At the time of sentencing the trial court 
neither advised plaintiff of his right to 
counsel nor made inquiry as to why 
counsel was not present. In the colloquy 
between the court and plaintiff, the court 
merely queried **840 whether it was 
plaintiffs desire not to wait but to be 
sentenced immediately, to which plaintiff 
responded affirmatively and expressed 
appreciation for prompt attention, as his 
stay in the jail was 'dead time.' 
11] During the evidentiary hearing on 
plaintiffs petition, the court queried 
whether the State desired to show a waiver 
by plaintiff of counsel at the sentencing 
The State responded negatively. The State 
was of the opinion that lack of counsel at 
the sentencing constituted harmless error. 
The issue of waiver was, therefore, not 
presented to the trial court. However, it 
should be observed that since plaintiff was 
not informed of his right to the presence of 
counsel, there is no ground upon which ot 
predicate a waiver of this right. [FN 1 j 
FNL See hi re Hanx 71 Cal.2d 
102L 80 Cal.Rptr. 588. 594 458 
P.2d 500.506 (1969V wherein the 
court stated: '. . . we cannot 
condone in the present case the 
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failure of the trial court to re inform 
defendant of his right to counsel 
when he appeared for the first time 
without his counsel for sentencing, 
nor can we countenance the trial 
court's failure to require defendant's 
waiver of his right to counsel in 
open court before the rendition of 
sentence.' 
Asid£...J.x...Scciion Ll,..X^>ns^ 
Utah, provides: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused 
shall have the right to appear and defend 
in person and by counsel,.... 
In the case of In re Boyce,[PX2] the court 
held that under *152Mide.j,..Sectipn..il 
of the Constitution of California, which is 
substantially similar to Article 1, Section 
12. of the Constitution of Utah, a 
defendant was entitled to counsel when 
judgment was pronounced and sentence 
imposed. The court held the judgment 
must be set aside and the matter remanded 
for resentencing with counsel present, 
where it appeared that defendant had been 
represented by counsel at all prior stages 
of the proceedings but was without 
counsel at the time the judgment and 
sentence were pronounced. This ruling 
was considered particularly applicable 
where there was nothing in the record to 
indicate that defendant was informed of 
his right to counsel or that he knew that he 
was entitled to the aid of an attorney. [FN 3] 
FN2. 51 Cal.2d 699, 33b P.2d 164, 
165 (1939). 
FN3. Also see People v. Hortoru 
174 Cal.App.2d 740. 345 P.2d 45. 
47 (1959V 
In Lee v. State, [F\4j the court stated that 
while there was a sharp conflict in 
authorities as to whether the presence of 
counsel for an accsed was necessary at the 
time of sentence, they thought the better 
rule was that when counsel had not been 
waived, the absence thereof invalidated the 
sentence. The court observed that if there 
were any time that a defendant on a 
criminal charge might be in need of an 
attorney to speak in his behalf or to advise 
him of his legal rights it could well be at 
the time of sentencing. 
FN4. 99 Ariz,.269,Ji)8.P Id 408, 
409 (1965V 
In this jurisdiction, Section 77-35—17, 
U.C.A.1953, grants the trial judge power 
to place the defendant on probation. 
. . . The granting or withholding of 
probation involves considering 
intangibles of character, personality and 
attitude, of which the cold record gives 
little inkling. These matters, which are 
to be considered in connection with the 
prior record of the accused, are of such 
nature that the problem of probation 
must of necessity rest within the 
discretion of the judge who hears the 
Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
case. . . .JFN5] 
FN5. State v Sihert. ft Utah 2d 
198. 205. 310 P.2d 388. 393 
(1957). 
[2] The foregoing indicates the necessity 
of the presence of counsel at the time of 
sentencing; so that there is a real 
opportunity to present to the court facts in 
extenuation of the offense or in 
explanation of the defendant's conduct, as 
well as to correct any errors or mistakes in 
reports of the defendant's past record and 
to appeal to the equity of the court in its 
administration **841 and enforcement of 
penal laws.[n<6] 
FN6. See Maitiiiv. UnitM.Sl3.tSS 
( C A 5th 19501182F.2d 225. 22 
A.L.R.2d 1236, 1239-1240. 
The conflict in the authorities to which the 
court made reference in Lee v. State [FN 7] 
has been resolved by the United States 
Supreme *153 Court. In McConnell v. 
Rhay,[FN8j the court stated: 
FN7. Note 4, supra. 
FN8. 3^3 US. X 4, 89 S O . 32. 2 i 
L.Ed.2d2.4fl968V 
As we said in Mempa (v Rhay, 389 
U.S. 128. 88 S.Ct 254.19 L.Ed.2d 336V 
'the necessity for the aid of counsel in 
marshaling the facts, introducing 
evidence of mitigating circumstances and 
in general aiding and assisting the 
defendant to present his case as to 
sentence is apparent.' 38*) T S al 135. 88 
S.Ct at 257. 19 L.Ed.2d at341. The 
right to counsel at sentencing must, 
therefore, be treated like the right to 
counsel at other stages of adjudication. 
121 & the instant action, since the record 
does not indicate that plaintiff knowingly 
and intelligently waived his right to 
counsel at the time of sentencing, we are 
compelled to hold his sentence invalid. 
However, this does not mean that the 
plaintiff is entitled to an absolute 
discharge. 
The defect in the first sentence did not 
inhere in the judgment of conviction. 
The defendant pleaded guilty, and made 
no attack on any of the proceedings 
except the sentence. Had he appealed 
from the illegal sentence, as he had a 
right to do, notwithstanding his plea of 
guilty, this court would have set aside 
the sentence as void and have remanded 
the case to the trial court for a valid 
sentence. (Citation) There is no 
principle on which it can be successfully 
maintained that, by serving part of a void 
sentence instead of appealing from it, but 
later attacking it in collateral 
proceedings, the defendant can obtain 
immunity from being sentenced to the 
judgment provided by law. 
(Citation)|TV>j 
Copr © West 2003 No Claim to Orig U S Govt Works 
FN9. State v Lee Lim, 79 Utah 68, 
72,7 P.2d 825.826 (1932): also see 
Ex Parte Folck, Folck v„JYa]ion:u 
102 Utah 470. 473. 132 PJd 130 
(1942V 
This cause is remanded to the district 
court with directions to proceed to fix a 
date for pronouncing sentence upon 
plaintiff in a manner consistent with the 
views herein expressed. 
TUCKETT, HENRIOD and CROCKETT, 
JJ., concur. 
ELLETT, Justice (concurring in the 
result): 
I concur in the result, not because there 
was any error below, but simply to avoid 
having the matter taken before the federal 
courts, where the defendant would be 
released. There is no federal question 
involved in this matter. [FNlj 
FN1. See my lonesome opinion in 
Dvett v. Turner. 20 Utah 2d 403. 
439 P.2d 266 (19681 
Even if the provisions of the Sixth 
Amendment were applicable to this case, 
it * 154 should not require a release of the 
defendant on a habeas corpus proceeding. 
So far as pertinent to this matter, that 
Amendment states: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right . . . to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
At the time of the adoption of this 
Amendment there was no right to counsel 
in the courts of England in felony cases. 
In fact, it was not until 1826, 50 years after 
the Amendment, that a defendant charged 
with felony in the courts of England could 
be represented by counsel at trial. 
It was a determination by the people of 
the 13 colonies to see that the new federal 
entity did not follow the rule of the 
English courts which prompted the 
language above quoted to be included in 
the Amendment. 
**842 The Amendment does not say, and 
it never was meant to say that a criminal 
must have counsel. All it ever said was 
that he had a right to have counsel to assist 
him. 
In this case the defendant was never 
denied any right to have counsel and so I 
would affirm the trial court in what was 
done. However, I can see no harm in 
permitting a new sentence to be imposed 
upon the defendant. 
499 P.2d 839, 28 Utah 2d 150 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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State v Montoya, 825 P.2d 676, 679 (Utah App. 1991) 
(Cite as: 825 P.2d 676) 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
David MONTOYA, Defendant and 
Appellant. 
No. 900319-CA. 
Dec. 31, 1991. 
Defendant convicted of attempted rape 
was resentenced more than a year later by 
the Second District Court, Weber County, 
Stanton M. Taylor, J., in order to permit 
appeal, and defendant appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Garff, J., held that: (1) 
resentencing for sole purpose ofpermitting 
appeal is improper; (2) review of appeal 
of resentencing must be limited to 
propriety of resentencing; (3) original 
sentence was legal; and (4) court lacked 
jurisdiction to resentence defendant. 
Appeal dismissed. 
West Headnotes 
[11 Criminal Law ^1081(4.1) 
llOklOSl^.n Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 110kl081(4)) 
In appeal permitted as matter of right, 
notice must be filed within 30 days after 
date of entry of judgment or order 
appealed from. Rules App Pioc , Ruk 
4(a). 
IH Criminal Law ^1069(1) 
110kl069(n Most Cited t\jse<; 
Time for filing appeal is jurisdictional and 
ordinarily cannot be enlarged. Rules 
App.Proc Rule 4(e). 
PI Sentencing and Punishment ^^2315 
350Hk2315 Most Cited Ca^s 
(Formerly 110k996(3)) 
Resentencing order by stipulation 
imposing same sentence as before, except 
giving credit for time served, for sole 
purpose ofpermitting appeal even though 
statutory period had passed, was 
inappropriate manipulation of judicial 
system. Rule^ > Civ Pioc , Rule foBfi). 
141 Criminal Law ^1134(3) 
110kll34m Most Cited Cases 
[41 Criminal Law ^1134(10) 
HOkl 134(10^ MONI Cued C ases 
Court of Appeals limited its review to 
sentence imposed, without considering 
validity of conviction, where defendant 
appealed resentencing, rather than 
following appropriate procedures to obtain 
postconviction relief. U.C.A.1953, 
77-35-22(e) (Repealed); Rules t <rv Proc , 
Rule 656^. 
Copr S West 2003 No Claim to Ong U S Govt Works 
[5] Sentencing and Punishment ^^2229 
350Hk2229 Mest.CheiCases 
(Formerly 110k996(l. 1)) 
[51 Criminal Law €^1134(10) 
110k! 134(10) MQSLQteiCases 
If original sentence imposed was valid, 
trial court would have had no further 
subject matter jurisdiction to resentence 
defendant, and Court of Appeals would 
have no jurisdiction to hear appeal of 
resentencing. 
161 Criminal Law ^ 1 0 3 3 . 1 
110kl033.1 Mounted. Cases 
(Formerly 11 Ok 103 3(1)) 
Court of Appeals can raise issue that goes 
to jurisdiction sua sponte and at any time. 
[7] Sentencing and Punishment € ^228 
350Hk228 Most.Cjte(l.Cases 
(Formerly 1 r6k979(2)) 
[7] Sentencing and Punishment €^2271 
350Hk2271 Most .Cjted.Cases 
(Formerly 110k979(2)) 
Because illegal sentence is void, court 
does not lose jurisdiction over sentence 
until that sentence has been corrected; 
likewise, once court imposes valid 
sentence, it loses subject matter 
jurisdiction over the case. 
[£1 Sentencing and Punishment € ^2229 
350Hk2229 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 110k996(l.l)) 
District court's jurisdiction over 
resentencing turns on whether initial 
sentence was legal. 
191 Sentencing and Punishment €^2279 
350Hk2279 M^iliMLCascs 
(Formerly 110k996(2)) 
Court can correct illegal sentence at any 
time. U.C.A.1953, 77-35- 22(e) 
(Repealed). 
[10] Criminal Law ^1134(10) 
110k! 134(10) Most Cited Cases 
Court of Appeals reviews appropriateness 
of resentencing of defendant convicted of 
attempted rape, but for whom no alienist 
was appointed, by determining whether 
court clearly erred in failing to comply 
with code section governing appointment 
of alienists at time of original sentence. 
U.C.A. 1953. 77-16-L 77-16-2. 
l U l Criminal Law ^^1158(1) 
110kll58m M ^ i l i M i l a s e s 
In reviewing judge's decision not to 
appoint alienist to evaluate defendant 
allegedly suffering from mental disease or 
defect, Court of Appeals uses clearly 
erroneous standard to review findings on 
the factors outlined in the statute, and 
reviews ultimate conclusion based on 
those findings for correctness. 
U.C.A.1953. 77-16-L 77-16-2; M^ 
Civ.Proc. Rule 52(aV 
[12] Criminal Law ^1144 .1 
110k! 144.1 Most Cited Cases 
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(Formerly 1 lOkl 144) 
Court of Appeals assumed that trial court 
found that defendant, who was allegedly 
suffering from mental disease, was not in 
fact suffering from mental disease or 
defect which may have substantially 
contributed to commission of offense, 
where trial court made no explicit findings 
in support of its decision not to appoint 
alienist. U.CA.1C>53, 77-16-1, 77-16-2. 
[13] Mental Health ^ 4 3 4 
257Ak434 Most Cited Cases 
Statute governing appointment of alienist 
to evaluate defendant alleged to suffer 
from mental disease or defect requires that, 
where circumstances suggest possibility 
that defendant has mental disease or 
defect, and where circumstances suggest 
that mental disease or defect may have 
substantially contributed to commission of 
crime, court shall order mental 
examination of that person. U.C. A .1.^ 53^ 
77-16-1. 
[14] Criminal Law ^ 9 8 1 ( 1 ) 
110k98im Most Cited Cases 
Court did not err in refusing to make 
finding that defendant may have been 
suffering from mental disease or defect 
that may have substantially contributed to 
commission of the crime, where evidence 
of mental illness referred to defendant's 
state of mind during trial and shortly after, 
and did not bear on defendant's state of 
mind during commission of crime nor 
suggest that mental disease or defect may 
have substantially contributed to 
commission of the offense. 
[15] Sentencing and Punishment 
€
^2229 
350Hk2229 Mosl.Cited..Cases 
(Formerly 110k996(l.l)) 
District court lacked jurisdiction to 
resentence defendant charged with 
attempted rape, where initial sentence was 
legal. 
*677 Jose Luis Trujillo, Salt Lake City, 
for defendant and appellant. 
R. Paul Van Dam and Judith S.H. 
Atherton, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and 
appellee. 
Before BENCH. GARFF, and JACKSON, 
JJ. 
OPINION 
GARFF, Judge: 
On November 23, 1988, David Montoya 
was convicted of attempted rape, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 76-4-102 and 76- i:401U.i?()). 
He now appeals his conviction. We 
dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
On December 15, 1988, a document 
entitled "Judgment, Sentence, and 
Commitment to Utah State Prison" was 
entered wherein Montoya was sentenced to 
a term *678 of one to fifteen years. 
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Montoya did not file an appeal within the 
statutory period after he was sentenced. 
However, apparently, in order to afford 
Montoya an enlargement of time to appeal 
his sentence, the State stipulated with 
Montoya to a resentencing. [FKJJ 
Pursuant to the stipulation, he was 
resentenced on May 14, 1990 so that he 
could timely appeal [FN2] 
FN1. The only document in the 
record suggesting the basis for 
resentencing is a letter written by 
the court to defense counsel: 
In response to your inquiry of April 
19, 1989 I did not order an 
evaluation at the State Hospital. I 
did recommend to the prison 
authorities that they evaluate him 
for possible hospitalization. 
If Mr. Montoya wishes to file an 
appeal, the State seldom objects to 
a resentencing for that purpose and 
it seems probable we could 
accommodate such a request. 
I have also enclosed a copy of his 
letter to me and hope you may 
address with him some of his 
concerns. 
FN2. In Suite v. Johnson ft35 P.2d 
36 (Utah 1981) the court, by way of 
dicta, suggests that a defendant 
who requests his or her attorney to 
file an appeal within the statutory 
thirty-day limit, and whose attorney 
fails to do so, may file a motion for 
postconviction relief pursuant to 
Utah R.Civ.P. 65B(i). If the court 
thereupon finds defendant's 
position meritorious, then 
resentencing would be appropriate 
in order to afford him an 
opportunity to appeal. MJJJL?JL 
Montoya filed his notice of appeal on 
June 12, 1990, wherein he stated he was 
appealing "the decision made May 14, 
1990 and the underlying conviction of 
attempted conviction of rape." He 
challenges his conviction and sentencing 
claiming (1) the court erred by failing to 
appoint an alienist [FN?] prior to 
sentencing, pursuant to Utah Code Ann £ 
77-16-2 (1980): (2) his counsel was 
inadequate because (a) he failed to petition 
for a competency hearing prior to trial, and 
(b) he failed to move that an alienist 
examine Montoya; and (3) the court erred 
by failing to disqualify a juror. We note 
that issue (1) pertains to Montoya's 
sentence, and issues (2) and (3) pertain to 
his conviction. 
FN3.M A seldom used term meaning 
one who has specialized in the 
study of mental diseases. Persons 
qualif ied by experience, 
knowledge, and previous 
opportunities to express opinion as 
to defendant's mental condition at a 
particular time." Black's Law 
Dictionary 67 (5th ed. 1979). 
TIMELY APPEAL 
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We first consider whether the appeals 
from the conviction and the sentence were 
timely filed. 
11112 J In an appeal permitted as a matter 
of right, the notice must be filed within 
thirty days "after the date of entry of the 
judgment or order appealed from." Utah 
RApp.P. 4(a). Here, the notice of appeal 
was filed well over a year after Montoya's 
conviction and sentence. The time for 
filing an appeal is jurisdictional and 
ordinarily cannot be enlarged. Suite v. 
Johnson 635 P.2d 36. 37 (Utah N81); 
State v. Boggess. 60 i P.2d 927, 928- 29 
(Utah 1979V [1N4] 
FN4. For example, Rule 4(e) of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
allows a trial court the discretion to 
extend the time for filing by thirty 
days. 
In Johnson, the court stated by way of 
dicta that postconviction proceedings 
"could be used, in carefully limited 
circumstances, to modify or vacate a 
judgment where extra-record facts showed 
that the defendant had been deprived of his 
constitutional right to a fair trial, including 
the right to the assistance of counsel." /{/.. 
at 38. The supreme court relied on Peo.llh 
v. Callaway. 24X.Y.2d 127,299\\¥,S.2d 
154, 247 N.E.2d 128 (1969) which 
suggests that the purpose of the 
postconviction hearing is to determine 
whether the defendant 
was induced, by reason of that 
representation, to allow his time to take 
an appeal to expire or that he was misled 
as to his right to appeal, he should—in 
accordance with the procedure we have 
adopted-be resentenced nunc pro tunc 
upon the previous finding of guilt so as 
to afford him "an opportunity of 
prosecuting and perfecting an appeal, 
since the time for taking such appeal 
would date from the rendition of the new 
judgment." 
Id 2Q9 N.Y.S.2d al 15b. 247 XMld ai 
130 (quoting People v ihursnm, 10 
N.Y.2d 92. 94 217 N.Y.S.2d 77. 78, 176 
N.E.2d 90. 91(196 ttl 
[3] *679 Here, nothing indicates the 
resentencing was conducted pursuant to 
UtahR.Civ.P.65B(rt or that findings were 
made pursuant to J ohm on. In fact, it 
appears that a hearing was not even held. 
Only an order was entered imposing the 
same sentence as before, except giving 
credit for time served. It appears the only 
purpose of the order was to open the door 
to an appeal even though the statutory 
period had long since passed. We find no 
merit to this procedure and deem such 
manipulation of the judicial system highly 
inappropriate. If the defendant has a 
legitimate claim that his constitutional 
right to a fair trial was violated because he 
was denied effective assistance of counsel, 
he should follow the procedures under 
Rule 65B(i) as outlined in Johnson. 
[4] Giving defendant the benefit of the 
doubt, we are presented here with an 
appeal of a resentencing, presumably 
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pursuant to Utah R Crim.P 22(e), which 
allows for correction of an illegal sentence. 
We therefore limit our review to the 
sentence and decline to even consider the 
conviction because it is not appropriately 
before us. 
JURISDICTION 
[5j[6j To determine whether Montoya's 
appeal of his resentencing is properly 
before this court, we must determine 
whether the initial sentence was valid. If 
it was valid, the trial court would have had 
no further subject matter jurisdiction to 
resentence Montoya. Likewise, this court 
would have no jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal. Because the issue goes to 
jurisdiction, this court can raise the issue 
sua sponte and at any time. Crump \ 
Crump. 8?) I12d 1172, 1175-74 (Utah 
App.1991). 
Ul[%l The Utah Supreme Court has 
recognized the 'continuing jurisdiction of 
a trial court to correct an illegal sentence." 
State v. Babbel 8 P P 2d Sh 88 {Utah 
1991V Because an illegal sentence is 
void, the court does not lose jurisdiction 
over the sentence until that sentence has 
been corrected W The negative 
implication of this principle is also spelled 
out in Buhhel Once a court imposes a 
valid sentence, it loses subject matter 
jurisdiction over the case, hi (citing State 
v. Lee Lim. 79 Utah 68, 74. 7 P 2d 825. 
827 (1932)). Thus, the district court's 
jurisdiction over the resentencing turns 
onwhether the initial sentence was legal. 
j9]|I0j A court can correct an illegal 
sentence at any time. Utah R.Crim P 
22(e) (1991); Bahhj /J* 1 ^ P 16 at 871 / tv 
Lim. 79 Utah at 7 1 7 P 2d at 82'»-27 We 
review the appropriateness of a 
resentencing by determining whether the 
court clearly erred m failing to comply 
with I ftah Code \\m ^ 77-16-1 and -2 at 
the time of the original sentence. Babnel, 
813P.2dat86: Sunt v Bahhjll 770 P 2d 
987. 993 (Utah 1989V 
Uah Code ^nn 6 77-jp-l (1900) 
requires the following: 
Whenever any person is convicted of or 
pleads guilty to rape ... or an attempt to 
commit [rape], and when it appears to 
the court either upon its own observation 
or upon evidence otherwise presented, 
that the defendant may be suffering from 
any form of mental disease or defect 
which may have substantially 
contributed to the commission of the 
offense, the court shall order a mental 
examination of that person. 
As to the mental examination itself, Utah 
Code Aim § 77-16-2 (1990;> requires that 
it be conducted "by two or more alienists 
appointed by the judge." 
[1 Ij In reviewing the judge's decision not 
to appoint an alienist, we use a clearly 
erroneous standard to review the findings 
on the factors outlined in the statute. Stat* 
v. DePlontv. 749 P 2d 62U fr27 (Uah 
1987); ri'NS] Utah R C\\ 1' Via). We 
review the ultimate conclusion based on 
those findings for correctness. DsPUmn. 
749 P.2d at 627; West Vail?) City \ 
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Majestic Irrv. Co.. 818 P 2d 131L 1313 
(Utah App. 1991V 
FN5. The language of Iltd!htUX. is 
potentially confusing: "On appeal, 
we do not disturb the conclusions 
of the trier of fact unless they are 
clearly erroneous. L ^ J L Q v J L 
32(a) (1987)." 749 P.2d at 62? 
(emphasis added). This passage 
refers to findings of fact despite 
usage of the word "conclusions." 
This interpretation is borne out by 
the reference to the "trier of fact" 
and by the cite to Ulah R.Civ.P. 
52(a) which specifically applies to 
findings of fact. 
|12j *680 Here, the court made no explicit 
findings as to the statutory factors. In 
such cases, "we 'assume that the trier of 
facts found them in accord with its 
decision, and we affirm the decision if 
from the evidence it would be reasonable 
to find facts to support it.' " Stale v. 
Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774. 787 (Utah 1Q9Q 
(quoting Ajosver v. McCarthy, 122J Jtah 1, 
6.245 P.2d 224. 226 (1952V). Therefore, 
because the court did not appoint an 
alienist, we assume the court found that 
Montoya was not suffering from a mental 
disease or defect which may have 
substantially contributed to the 
commission of the offense. 
Accordingly, the first issues in 
determining whether the court clearly 
erred in its findings supporting its refusal 
to appoint an alienist in the initial 
sentencing are (1) whether, from the 
evidence or from the court's observation, 
Montoya may have been suffering from a 
mental disease or defect; and (2) whether 
the mental disease or defect may have 
substantially contributed to the 
commission of the crime. 
[13] In analyzing the statute, we note the 
combination of mandatory and permissive 
language. That is, the statute requires 
that, where circumstances suggest a 
possibility that a defendant has a mental 
disease or defect, and where circumstances 
suggest that the mental disease or defect 
may have substantially contributed to the 
commission of the crime, "the court shall 
order a mental examination of that 
person." Utah Code Ann. $ 77-16-1 
(1990) (emphasis added). Accord 
DePlonty. 749 P.2d at (>25. 
DAI As to the trial itself, Montoya 
testified on his own behalf. He was 
subjected to direct, cross, and redirect 
examination. The transcript reveals he 
was coherent. He said nothing about a 
mental disease or defect, nor did his 
counsel elicit any information or behavior 
suggesting one. While his testimony 
differed from that of the victim, his 
answers pertained to the questions posed. 
His appropriate reference to her testimony 
during his own evidences his ability to 
track the victim's testimony. In short, 
neither the evidence produced at trial nor 
Montoya's demeanor during the trial 
should have caused the court to find that 
Montoya may have suffered from a mental 
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disease or defect. 
After the verdict was read, the following 
conversation ensued: 
MR. POORMAN: Your Honor, it's my 
client's desire to request a pre-sentence 
report in this matter. Mrs. Garner's 
indicated to me a date of December 12th, 
that she could have that report prepared 
by then. 
We would also request of the Court a 
court order with regards to a 
psychological examination of Mr. 
Montoya while he stays at—pending that 
pre- sentence report by Mrs. Garner. 
THE COURT: Any objection to that, 
Mr. Heward? 
MR. HEWARD: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. So ordered. 
Do you need a special order on that, 
Debbie, or do you make arrangements? 
MS. GARNER: Are you going to use 
alienists or are you going to use— 
THE COURT: I think probably that 
might be preferable. 
MS. GARNER: Can they get it done? 
I mean, can they see him? What—I 
think, if I may express myself, he needs 
or wants treatment or at least to be seen 
by somebody right now. He's really 
concerned about his-about his well-
being. 
THE COURT: Well, rather than doing it 
on a formal basis and to appoint an 
alienist, why don't we just refer the 
matter to Weber County Mental Health 
and let's have someone from Mental 
Health come over and visit with him. 
MR. POORMAN: That will be fine, 
Your Honor. 
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THE COURT: Why don't we do this. 
Let's contact Steve Watson and just 
explain that they're not-they're not only 
concerned about the sentence, but the 
defendant apparently is having some 
problems. So we'll have Mr. Watson or 
someone from his office come over and 
speak to him. 
In response to the court's request, Steven 
Watson, a clinical social worker from 
Weber County Mental Health, visited with 
Montoya and filled out an assessment form 
as follows: 
*681 At request of Judge Taylor subject 
seen. Mental status: Orient X 3 clear 
stream of thought. Makes some 
suggestion of hallucination but 
genuineness is questionable. Wants 
sleeping or nerve pills. If continues in 
jail here, evaluate further in a week. 
As to this postverdict colloquy, the only 
evidence of a mental disease or defect 
relates to the comments of Montoya's 
counsel, those of the AP & P officer, and 
the one-paragraph report from the Weber 
County Mental Health social worker. 
Specifically, the AP & P officer mentioned 
that Montoya was concerned "about his 
well-being" at the present time, and that he 
wanted treatment. The social worker 
questioned the genuineness of Montoya's 
suggestion that he was hallucinating. 
The evidence just described goes only to 
Montoya's current state of mind during the 
trial and shortly after. It does not go to 
Montoya's state of mind during the 
commission of the crime, nor does it 
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suggest that any such mental disease or END OF DOCUMENT 
defect "may have substantially contributed 
to the commission of the offense." Thus, 
the court did not clearly err in refusing to 
make such a finding. Accordingly, the 
statute was never triggered and the initial 
sentence was therefore valid. [FNbj 
FN6. Montoya would have us 
consider a presentence report 
completed December 2, 1988. 
This report is not part of the 
appellate record, and its 
authenticity cannot be verified. 
Therefore this court cannot 
consider it. Even so, we see 
nothing in the report which would 
support a finding that any mental 
disease or defect may have 
substantially contributed to the 
commission of the offense. 
U51 Because any jurisdiction to 
resentence Montoya would have to have 
been based on an illegality or voidness in 
the initial sentence, and because the initial 
sentence was legal, the district court lost 
subject matter jurisdiction over Montoya's 
sentence. Consequently, this court has no 
jurisdiction and we are therefore required 
to dismiss the appeal. 
Dismissed. 
BENCH and JACKSON, JJ., concur. 
825 P.2d 676 
Copr © West 2003 No Claim to Ong U S Govt Works 
